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QUESTIONS PRESENTED

1. Whether the district court was clearly erroneous
in finding that petitioner's rejection of respondent's candidacy for partnership was caused, in part, by discrimination based on sex.

2. Whether, given this finding, the courts below properly placed on petitioner the burden of proving that the
same result would have been reached absent discrimination.
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No. 87-1167

PRICE WATERHOUSE,

Petitioner

v.
ANN B. HOPKINS,

Respondent
On Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the
United States Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia Circuit

BRIEF FOR RESPONDENT'
IN OPPOSITION

OPINIONS BELOW

The opinion of the court of appeals (Pet. App. la-39a)
is reported at 825 F.2d 458. The opinion of the district
court (Pet. App. 40a-62a) is reported at 618 F.Supp.
1109.
JURISDICTION

The judgment of the court of appeals was entered on
August 4, 1987 (Pet. App. ·6 3a), and a petition for rehearing was denied on September 30, 1987 (Pet. App.
65a). On December 11, 1987 the Chief Justice extended
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the time for filing the petition for a writ of certiora ri to
January 12, 1988. The jurisdic tion of this Court is invoked under 28 U.S.C. 1254 ( 1).
ST'.A TEMENT

This case examined the elaborate and unique admissions process of petition er Price Waterhouse, a large nationwide firm that in 1983 rejected respondent Ann Hopkins' candidacy for partner ship. The partner ship admissions process occurs annually, stretchi ng over a nine
month period, and involves consideration of scores of
candidates. Each admissions cycle includes, among other
things, discussion and nomination of candida tes by partners in a local office, "long form" or "short form" written comments by partner s from other offices ( depending
on how well they knew particu lar candida tes), office
visits and discussion by an Admissions Committee, and
more discussion and final action by the Policy Board,
Price Waterh ouse's governi ng body. Pet. App. 5a, 41a42a. The admissions process is collegial in the broades t
sense, with actors able to exert influence at myriad points
along the path and-as the district court found- with
special weight accorded negative views. Pet. App. 50a.
Ann Hopkins received a glowing nomina tion from her
local office, Pet. App. 4a, and was one of 88 senior managers at Price Waterh ouse considered for partner ship
in the 1982-83 admissions cycle. The other 87 candida tes
were men. At the time, Price Waterhouse had 662 partners nationally, of whom 7 were women. Hopkins had
secured some $40 million in new business for the firm,
more than any other candidate. She also had more billable hours than any of the men, and her clients were
"very pleased" with her work. Pet. App. 43a.
In early 1983 Hopkins was notified that she had not
been selected as a partner . At that point, she discussed
her chances for future selection with the partner -incharge of her office, who the district court found was "re-
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sponsible for telling her what problems the Policy Board
had identified with her candidacy." Pet. App. 52a. He
advised her to
walk more femininely, talk more femininely, dress
more femininely, wear make-up, have her hair styled,
and wear jewelry.
Id. Later, after again being passed over for partnership,
Hopkins began the administrative process that culminated in this litigation.

The district court treated this case as one of mixed
lawful-unlawful motivation, noting that some partners
raised nondiscriminator y concerns about respondent. But
the court also expressly found that discrimination based
on sex infected Price Waterhouse's consideration of Hopkins' candidacy, Pet. App. 58a-59a, and that "denial of
partnership in her specific situation was caused, in part,"
by this discrimination. Pet. App. 62a. These findings
were grounded on an intensive examination of the partnership admissions process-includin g but not limited to
candidate evaluations tendered by individual partnersand on the testimony of a social psychologist whom the
court described as a "well qualified expert." Pet. App.
53a.
Having found that unlawful as well as lawful factors
played a role in Hopkins' rejection, the district court then
followed settled precedent and inquired whether Price
Waterhouse had proved that Hopkins would have been
rejected even in a bias-free setting. Mt. Healthy City
School Dist. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 287 (1977); National
Labor Relations Board v. Transportation Management
Corp., 462 U.S. 393, 403 (1983). The court found that
Price Waterhouse had not carried its burden, and a
Title VII violation was established. Pet. App. 59a-60a.
The court of appeals affirmed the trial court's finding
that Price Waterhouse had violated Title VII in excluding Hopkins from partnership. Describing the firm's
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argument-similar to the one made in this Court-as
"nothing more than a thinly disguised quarrel with the
District Court over appropriate inferences to be drawn
from the evidence before it," Pet. App. lla, the court
of appeals found "ample support" for the trial court's
finding that discrimination had "infected" the partnership selection process to Hopkins' detriment. Pet. App.
17a. This evidence consisted of the comments made about
her, including the especially telling advice from her partner-in-charge to walk, talk and dress "more femininely";
expert testimony that sexual stereotyping played a major
role in Price Waterhouse's consideration of Hopkins; and
negative comments made about previous female candidates. Pet. App. 12a-17a. The court of appeals also held
that, given the evidence of mixed motivation, the trial
court correctly shifted the burden to Price Waterhouse
"to show that the decision would have been the same
absent discrimination." Pet. App. 23a. Since petitioner
could not make this showing, the court of appeals ruled
that the district court properly found Price Waterhouse
liable under Title VII. Pet. App. 25a. 1
REASONS FOR DENYING THE WRIT

The decision of the court of appeals is correct, is consistent with the decisions of this Court, and does not
present a conflict with any decision of any other court of
appeals that warrants this Court's review or that would
make a difference in the outcome here.
1. Introduction. This case does not warrant review
by this Court. Decisions on partnership are covered by
1 Hopkins had left Price Waterhouse
after being passed over for
partnership the second time, and the district court declined to award
relief on the grounds that she had not proved constructive discharge
and had failed to present adequate proof on damages. Pet. App.
59a-62a. The court of appeals reversed this aspect of the trial
court's decision and remanded for entry of "full relief." Pet. App.
25a-28a. Price Waterhouse does not here challenge this ruling.
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Title VII, Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69
( 1984) , and the courts below followed settled legal principles in determ ining that Price Waterh ouse denied partnership status to Ann Hopkins in violation of the Act.
Price Waterhouse employs variou s argum ents in seeking to have this Court review this liabilit y determ ination .
Foremost, petitio ner asserts that there was no evidence
that discrim ination played any role in the decision to
reject Hopkins. The problem here, of course, is that the
distric t court found otherwise, and that finding is not
clearly erroneous. Anders on v. City of Bessemer, 470
U.S. 564 ( 1985) . The court of appeals considered and
rejected this factua l argum ent, and no justific ation exists for furthe r review by this Court. Rogers v. Lodg(}.,
458 U.S. 613, 623 (1982).
Price Waterhouse also tries to sugges t that it was
error, in a mixed motivation case where unlawf ul motivation had been established, to shift the burden to the
employer to prove that the same decision would have
been made absent discrimination. Yet this Court' s precedents require just this approach, Mt. Healthy, 429 U.S.
at 287, and the courts of appeals have routine ly adhere d
to it in Title VII cases presen ting questions of mixed
motivation.

I

Ultima tely petitio ner is reduced to arguin g that, assuming the courts below were right- as they were- in
placing the burden on Price Waterh ouse to prove that
Hopkins would have been rejected even in a neutra l setting, the proper eviden tiary standa rd is prepon derant
rather than clear and convincing evidence. Petitio ner
did not press this point below, however, and for good
reason : its resolution would make no difference in this
case. Price Waterh ouse did not begin to prove -unde r
any standa rd-tha t Ann Hopkin s would have been denied partne rship in the absence of discrimination. Moreover, even apart from this suit, there is little if any ma-
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terial distinction between the preponderant and clear
and convincing standards as applied in Title VII cases,
so there is no conflict warranting review by this Court.
In any event, the clear and convincing standard is employed by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commi&sion in similar cases, and its use here was proper. 29
C.F.R. 1613.271.
2. The Clearly Erroneous Standard and the Facts.
Although ostensibly seeking review of legal issues, Price
Waterhouse repeatedly argues the facts, suggesting that
this was not truly a case of mixed motivation because
there was no evidence that discrimination played any
role in its rejection of respondent's candidacy. The district court, however, found otherwise. The trial court's
opinion details the evidence supporting its finding of discrimination, but two points are especially instructive.
The first is the advice Hopkins got from her boss, the
partner-in-charge of her office, who counseled her to
"walk more femininely, talk more femininely, dress more
femininely," etc. Pet. App. 52a. This advice had nothing
to do with Hopkins' professional bearing or appearance
-she was always well turned out-but it had everything
to do with her sex. Second, the partners themselves knew
what was going on; as the district court found, Hopkins'
"[s] upporters indicated that her critics judged her harshly
due to her sex." Pet. App. 51a.
As can be seen, the district court's finding of discrimination is amply supported, and it is shielded by Rule 52.
Anderson v. City of Bessemer, 470 U.S. at 573-74. This
is especially true here, where the trial court was required
to undertake detailed scrutiny of a complex and multifaceted partnership admissions process.

In its petition, Price Waterhouse concentrates on trying to discredit the testimony-indee d the field of expertise-of Hopkins' expert. But the criticisms are the
same ones made in the court of appeals, which properly
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disposed of them. The court observed that the expert
was operating within the standard s of her discipline in
concluding that sexual stereotyp ing played a "major determinin g role" in petitione r's decision to reject respondent's candidacy, and it noted that other evidence -including the "extreme ly small number" of female partners at
Price Waterho use and the "positive assessments of
Hopkins in areas where performa nce could be measured
objectiv ely"-sup ported that conclusion. Pet. App. 14a15a:2
More importan t, the expert testimony was not the only
evidence of discrimin ation relied on by the district court.
Conspicuously absent from the petition is any reference
to the advice that Hopkins' boss gave her to behave "more
femininely." This is direct evidence of discrimination,
which the dissent below referred to as a "smoking gun."
Pet. App. 31a. Indeed, it is remarkab le that such proof
could be adduced in a case involving sophisticated professionals. The dissent recognized that this evidence had
to be addressed, although it did so only by incorrectly
arguing that the district court was clearly erroneous in
attaching significance to it. Id. Petitione r may be reluctant to make such an unvarnis hed assertion of clear
error in this Court, so it simply ignores the "smoking
gun" altogether. But it remains, and it is central to this
case.

r'

The district court concluded that Price Waterho use did
nothing to address the "conspicuous problem" of sexual
sterotypi ng in its admissions process and that, instead,
the process gave "substan tial weight" to comments influenced by such stereotypes. These factors "combined to
~ Although petitioner here casts aspersions on the expert's competence and her field, the court of appeals observed that Price
Waterhous e "failed to challenge the validity of [the expert's] discipline at trial and disavows any such challenge here." Pet. App.
15a. Moreover, at trial Price Waterhous e volunteere d that it had
"no objection to the expertise of this witness." 3/ 28/ 85 Tr. 540.
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produce discrimination in the case of this plaintiff." Pet.
App. 58a.
In assessing these findings, the record must be "viewed
in its entirety." Anderson v. City of Bessemer, 470 U.S.
at 574. From this perspective, it is plain that the district court was not clearly erroneous in finding that discrimination played a role in Price Waterhouse's rejection
of Ann Hopkins' candidacy for partnership. The court
of appeals carefully considered the record, and no purpose would be served by having this Court again review
these factual findings. Rogers v. Lodge, 458 U.S. at 623.
3. The Law. Given its findings of fact, the legal analysis employed by the district court was unexceptional.
Even Judge Williams, dissenting in the court of appeals,
argued the facts, not the law. Thus he had "no quarrel"
with the principle that a "party acting with one permissible motive and one unlawful one may prevail only
by affirmatively proving that it would have acted as it
did even if the forbidden motive were absent." Pet. App.
38a, citing Mt. Healthy, 429 U.S. at 287, and NLRB v.
Transportation Management Corp., 462 U.S. at 403.
There could not be any quarrel with this basic principle,
for this Court has adhered to it in many contexts involving mixed motivation. E.g., Mt. Healthy (activity implicating the First Amendment) ; NLRB v. Transportation Management Corp. (unfair labor practice); Village
of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 270 n.21 ( 1977) (local zoning
decision allegedly motivated in part by race).
Indeed, contrary to Price Waterhouse's suggestion, this
Court has made it clear that this principle applies to
Title VII. East Texas Motor Freight System v. Rodriguez,
431 U.S. 395, 403 n.9 ( 1977) (" [e] ven assuming,
arguendo, that the company's failure even to consider
the applications was discriminatory, the company was
entitled to prove at trial that the respondents had not
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.

been injured because they were not qualified and would
not have been hired in any event," citing Mt. Healthy
and International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United
States, 431 U.S. 324 ( 1977) ) . The Court has also made
clear that Texas Department of Community Affairs v.
Burdine, 450 U.S. 248 (1981)-upon which petitioner
mistakenly relies-is "inapposite" to cases of mixed
motivation, because in Burdine " [t] he Court discussed
only the situation in which the issue is whether illegal or
legal motives, but not both, were the 'true' motives behind the decision." NLRB v. Transportation Management Corp., 462 U.S. at 400 n.5.
In short, this Court has provided clear guidance on the
basic analytical approach to be used in cases of mixed
motivation, and the circuit courts have routinely employed it where appropriate under Title VII. Fields v.
Clark University, 817 F'.2d 931, 936 (1st Cir. 1987);
Patterson v. Greenwood School Dist. 50, 696 F.2d 293,
295 ( 4th Cir. 1984) ; Smallwood v. United Airlines, Inc.,
728 F.2d 614, 618 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 832
(1984); r.i Davis v. Board of School Commissioners of
Mobile County, 600 F.2d 470, 474 (5th Cir. 1979);
Terbovitz v. Fiscal Court of Adair County, 825 F.2d 111,
115 ( 6th Cir. 1987); Blalock v. Metals Trades, Inc., 775
F.2d 703, 712 ( 6th Cir. 1985) ; Caviale v. Wisconsin Department of Health and Social Services, 744 F.2d 1289,
1296 (7th Cir. 1984); Bibbs v. Block, 778 F.2d 1318
(8th Cir. 1985) (en bane); Nanty v. Burrows Co., 660
F.2d 1327, 1333 (9th Cir. 1981) ; Harbison v. Goldschmidt, 693 F.2d 115, 117 ( 10th Cir. 1982) ; Bell v.
3 Petitioner erroneously
claims that it is unclear whether the
Fourth Circuit has adopted this Court's approach to mixed motivation and seeks to disparage Patterson v. Greenwood School Dist. 50
-which embraced this approach-by asserting that the Fourth Circuit has never since relied on Patterson. Pet. 14 n.6. This is not so.
The Fourth Circuit expressly and prominently relied on Patterson
in Smallwood v. United Airlines, Inc., 728 F.2d at 618.
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Birmingham Linen Service, 715 F.2d 1552, 1557 ( 11th
Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1204 (1984).
There is no division in the circuits warranting review
by this Court on the question of the proper a pp roach to
be taken in mixed motivation cases under Title VII. Mt.
Healthy is the polestar. Price Waterhouse's attempt to
suggest a division is misguided. 4
Ultimately petitioner retreats and recognizes that the
legal approach taken below was consistent with this
Court's decisions. Pet. 20 n.10. Price Waterhouse then
quibbles whether this approach should be followed in
Title VII cases, but as noted above this Court has already
applied the Mt. Healthy analysis to Title VII. East
4 Thus petitioner relies in part on decisions that are "inapposite"
because they were traditional Burdine cases that did not involve
findings of mixed motivation, e.g., Bellissimo v. Westinghouse Elec.
Corp., 764 F .2d 175 (3d Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1035
(1986); Lewis v. University of Pittsburgh, 725 F.2d 910 (3d Cir.
1983), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 892 (1984); Ross v. Communication s
Satellite Corp., 759 F.2d 355 (4th Cir. 1985). Petitioner also asserts that there is a split in the circuits over whether "but for"
causation is required under Title VII and implies that the Mt.
Healthy line of authority employs some other standard of causation.
This ignores the fact that Mt. Healthy itself provides. a vehicle for
determining whether an unlawful motive was a "but for" cause of
a challenged decision, as the Third Circuit recognized in a case
relied on by petitioner, Lewis v. University of Pittsburgh, 725 F.2d
at 916 (Mt. Healthy "did not deviate from the requirement of
'but for' causation; rather, its only effect was to allocate and
specify burdens of proof"). This is correct and-as shown in the
text-the circuits have followed the allocation of burdens specified
in Mt. Healthy. Moreover, whether the burdens are said to be
allocated in assessing liability or remedy makes no difference in
result. Any differences on the basic Mt. Healthy approach reside
within the circuits, not between them. Compare Davis v. Board of
School Commissioners of Mobile County, 600 F.2d at 474, with
Jack v. Texaco Research Center, 743 F.2d 1129 (5th Cir. 1984);
and Caviale v. Wisconsin Department of Health and Social Services,
744 F .2d at 1296, with McQuillen v. Wisconsin Education Ass'n
Council, 830 F.2d 659 (7th Cir. 1987), petition for cert. filed, 56
U.S.L.W. 3462 (Dec. 11, 1987) (No. 87-999).
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Texas Motor Fre~ght System v. Rodriguez, 431 U.S. at
403 n.9. Finally, petitioner says that, assuming it was
prqper for the courts below to place the burden on Price
Waterhouse to prove that Ann Hopkins would have been
rejected for partnership even in a nondiscriminatory setting, the proper standard is preponderant rather than
clear and convincing evidence.
It is of course true that not all courts use the clear
and convincing formulation to describe the employer's
burden once discrimination has been established. E.g.,
Bibbs v. Block, 778 F.2d at 1325 (preponderant evidence). But this is an archetypal distinction without a
difference; its resolution is unlikely to affect any case and
certainly would not affect the result here. For this reason, Price Waterhouse failed to press this point below,
and that alone is sufficient reason to deny the writ.
Duignan v. United States, 274 U.S. 195, 200 (1927);
Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 147 n.2
(1970) ; Tacon v. Arizona, 410 U.S. 351, 352 ( 1973) .'5
In the court of appeals, Hopkins asserted that "Price
Waterhouse could not make the requisite showing under
either [the preponderant or clear and convincing] standard and has not suggested otherwise." '6 Petitioner never
disputed this. Even in this Court Price Waterhouse does
not contend that it proved, by a preponderance of the
evidence, that Ann Hopkins would have been rejected in
a nondiscriminatory setting. It did not even begin to
make this showing. The partnership admissions process
was broadly collegial; it gave special weight to negative
views; there were any number of points along the way
where influence could be exerted; and views were not
always documented. As applied to Hopkins, this process
5

The only reference to this point below came very late in a short
footnote (n.5) in Price Waterhouse's petition for rehearing in the
court of appeals.
6

Reply Brief for Appellant-Cross Appellee at 27 n.11.
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was infected by discrimination, as the courts below found.
Given the specialized and complex nature of the admissions process as well as the absence of any effort by
Price Waterhouse to purge this infection, petitioner did
not show that an individual of Hopkins' outstanding objective credentials-e.g., first among the candidates in
business produced and hours billed-would still have been
rejected even if the process had been untained by discrimination. This failure of proof is as evident under
a preponderant standard as under a clear and convincing
test.
Since the same result would be reached here under
either standard, this case is a poor vehicle for addressing
any conflict. As a practical matter, moreover, the ostensible conflict presents at most a narrow difference in approach, and there appear to be no cases in which the
outcome would have been different had a preponderant
rathe·r than a clear and convincing standard been applied.
Hence addressing this issue here would at best serve limited theoretical purposes; no meaningful conflict would
be resolved, and the decision would not affect the result
in this case.
Finally, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission requires use of clear and convincing evidence in the
area of Federal employment, where the Commission has
direct regulatory authority. 29 C.F.R. 1613.271.7 Congress intended that cases of discrimination in the Federal government and the private sector be accorded the
same treatment, e.g., Chandler v. Roudebush, 425 U.S.
840 (1976), so it was proper for the courts below to
employ the evidentiary standard sanctioned by EEOC.13
In General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 142 (1976), the
Court noted the distinction between regulations and guidelines of
EEOC and held that less weight would be accorded guidelines. The
provision cited in the text, in contrast, is a binding regulation.
7

8 This also disposes of two of petitioner's other contentions. The
first is that guidance by this Court is needed for Federal employ-
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If the propriety of using the preponderant or the clear
and convincing standard in the mixed motivation setting
is ever to be addressed, this should occur in a case in
which the facts precisely paint the distinction, if any,
between the two formulations, i.e., where a difference in
approach means a different in result. That is not true
here. On the contrary, the size and complexity of Price
Waterhouse's partnership admissions process make this
case an especially poor canvas for examining this issue.
CONCLUSION

The petition for a writ of certiorari should be denied.
Respectfully submitted,
JAMES H. HELLER

Counsel of Record
DOUGLAS B. HURON
KA.TOR, SCOTT & HELLER

1029 Vermont Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20005
(202) 393-3800
February 1988

ment. Pet. 17 n.8. But, as is shown, the Federal sector is already
governed by clear EEOC regulations. The second contention is that
42 U.S.C. 2000e-2(a) (1) requires a different approach to cases of
mixed motivation under Title VII than has been taken in other
contexts. Pet. 19-20. Obviously the EEOC, the agency entrusted
with administering the statute, does not share this view. In this
regard, see also the discussion of East Texas Motor Freight System
v. Rodriguez at 8-9, supra.

